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Executive Orders, 'The Very
Definition of Tyranny," and the
Congressional Solution, the
Separation of Powers Restoration Act
by LEANNA M. ANDERSON*
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. 1
The doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental to the
American system. The Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress,2 judicial power in the courts,3 and executive power in the
President.! But what if the President were to usurp legislative
powers? What if the common law made it almost impossible for
citizens and state and local government officials to challenge the
exercise of these powers? Executive orders are Presidential actions
that often have legislative effects, but such orders are frequently
shielded from review in the courts.
Since President Washington issued the first executive order in
1793,' controversy has surrounded the issuance of executive orders.
*Law Clerk to the Honorable Howard R. Lloyd, United States Magistrate Judge,
2002-2003; J.D. 2002, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1998,
University of Utah. I would like to thank the staff of Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly for editing this note. Although it hardly seems adequate in the limited context
of this footnote, I would also like to thank my husband, Jeff, for everything.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. Bryan A. Liang, "A Zone of Twilight": Executive Orders in the Modern Policy
State 4, in 3 NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, BRIEFLY...
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION 3 (George C.
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Historically, the executive order was used mainly for disposition of
public property and designation of certain lands for military or Native
American use.6 Today, there are three main types of presidential
proclamations that may have legal force: those directed towards
agents of the executive branch, those in connection with the
President's role as Commander in Chief, and those pursuant to
Congressional authorization.7 Presidents may use this power to
regulate executive branch employees, to recognize or create a
national holiday, or to transfer property between government offices.8
Although executive order power is not specifically granted in the
Constitution, Presidents may point to their general power as head of
the executive branch or their role as Commander in Chief as
Constitutional sources for executive order power.9  Despite the
seemingly innocuous historical role of executive orders, Presidents
are frequently criticized for the scope of their executive orders."
Partially realizing Madison's fear of tyranny, critics often suggest that
broad executive orders border on Presidential "legislating.""
Furthering the threat of tyranny, courts seldom rule against
executive orders. 2 The United States Supreme Court has seldom
addressed cases involving executive orders. In fact, the Court has
only ruled against the expansive use of executive orders once. 3
Landrith, III ed., Mar. 1999); Susan Page, When a Law is Unlikely, Often an Order Will
Do, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 11, 1997, at 7A.
6. John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One), 31
UWLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2000) (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 100.
8. Id. at 101.
9. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Liang, supra note 5, at 4-7 (discussing the broad scope of executive
orders issued by Presidents Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson,
Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Ford).
11. See, e.g., Clinton as Legislator, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 8, 1999, at A12 ("Let's
stop Clinton before he legislates again."); Page, supra note 5 ("For a president, an
executive order can be as powerful as a law-and considerably easier to achieve.").
12. See infra Part 1.
13. See generally John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders
(Part Two), 31 UWLA L. REV. 123, 123 (2000). John Sterling wrote: "The Supreme Court
had ruled only once against expansive use of the Executive Order prior to Bill Clinton's
first term in the Oval Office." Id. He then states that the Supreme Court ruled twice
against Clinton with regard to executive orders. Id. However, he later cites Chamber of
Commerce v. Reich and Clinton v. City of New York as two cases against President Clinton
and executive orders. Id. at 131-32. However, this author found the following: 1)
Although the case does involve an executive order, Chamber of Commerce v. Reich is not
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Lower federal courts regularly uphold executive orders.1 4  The
seemingly limited review of executive orders coupled with criticism of
the increasingly broad scope of orders suggests that an examination of
executive order authority is important.
In this Note, I will review the breadth of executive order power
by analyzing legal challenges to that power and suggested legislation
intended to limit executive order power. Part I argues that executive
orders are frequently upheld by federal courts and are difficult to
challenge. This section examines past challenges to executive orders,
both successful and unsuccessful, and develops suggestions for
bringing a successful challenge to executive order power. Part II
applies the suggestions in Part I to one of President Clinton's
executive orders to illustrate how difficult it currently is to bring a
challenge to an executive order. Part III examines the proposed
Separation of Powers Restoration Act, 5 and argues that the proposed
act would facilitate challenges to executive orders.
I. Challenges to executive orders
There have been many challenges to executive orders throughout
history.6  This section will examine common executive order
challenges and consider similarities in these challenges. By drawing
similarities, this section will develop a list of prerequisites for
challenging an executive order by analyzing unsuccessful challenges
to executive orders. This section will suggest four sets of
circumstances under which federal courts will strike down executive
orders by looking at four cases where orders were successfully
challenged.
a Supreme Court case. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
2) Clinton v. City of New York is a Supreme Court case; however, it involves a challenge to
Presidential action pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act, which is distinguishable from the
executive orders discussed here. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Thus, eliminating John Sterling's
two Clinton cases, the Supreme Court only ruled against the expansive use of executive
orders once.
14. See infra Part 1.
15. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. (2001).
16. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
EPA, 278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 966 (1976); Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
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A. Order must have the force and effect of law
To be challengeable, an executive order must have the force and
effect of law.17  Under the United States Code, federal court
jurisdiction is limited to "federal question[s]."' 8 "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'9 For federal
courts to have jurisdiction over a civil action challenging an executive
order, the order must have the "force and effect of law."2°
There are two different branches of analysis under this
requirement. First, if the order is issued in accordance with
Congressional statutory mandate or delegation, the order has the
force and effect of law.2 However, if the order is not based on an
express Congressional grant of authority, federal courts may either
look for an implied Congressional basis for the order or find that no
statutory basis exists so that the order does not have the force and
effect of law.
1. Express Statutory Authority
Federal courts have repeatedly held or noted in dicta that
executive orders issued pursuant to statutory mandate have the
"force and effect of law.,
22
Congress may delegate lawmaking powers to the executive
branch, including its administrative agencies, through
statute .... When a President issues an executive order on the
basis of a grant of statutory authority, the President
theoretically exercises legislative authority delegated to
Congress. As such, federal courts have treated such executive
orders as the equivalent of federal statutes, having the force and
17. Liang, supra note 5, at 10.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc. 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 7 (3d Cir. 1964); Chen v. INS,
95 F.3d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1996) (superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1999)).
21. Liang,supra note 5, at 10.
22. See, e.g., Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1996) (superceded by statute
on other grounds as stated in Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1999)); Indep. Meat
Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976);
Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967).
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effect of law.23
Since statutes issued by Congress are federal laws for jurisdiction
purposes, it follows that executive orders based on statutory mandate
have the force and effect of law. The analysis becomes more
complicated when the executive order is not issued pursuant to clear
Congressional mandate.
2. No Express Statutory Authority
If an executive order is not based on statutory authority,
challenging that order is more difficult. In this case, courts may only
allow the challenge if the order is based on an implied Congressional
grant of authority. For example, in Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of
Labor, the plaintiffs were challenging the validity of the Philadelphia
Plan, which was developed by the Department of Labor pursuant to
Executive Order No. 11,246.24 The court found that the President had
implied authority from Congress to implement an appropriation
program and that, in the absence of a contrary Congressional
enactment, the Philadelphia Plan was within the implied authority
granted.25 Since the court in Contractors Ass'n found there was
implied Congressional authority for the Order,26 the Order should
have had the force and effect of law so that it could be challenged.
However, once the court found that the Order was authorized by
Congress, the court also found that the Executive Order was valid
because it was within the authority granted.27  Further, the court
found that the Philadelphia Plan was valid because the Executive
Order granted broad authority to the Labor Department.2 Thus,
although the plaintiffs in this case succeeded in proving that the
Executive Order had the force and effect of law, the plaintiffs lost
because the authority, which gave the Order the force and effect of
law, also gave the President sufficient discretion to issue the Order.
Federal courts may find that an order may not be challenged if
the order does not have a statutory basis of authority.29 For example,
23. Liang, supra note 5, at 8 (internal citations omitted).
24. Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied
sub nom. Contractors Ass'n v. Hodgson, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
25. Id. at 171.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 171,175-77.
28. Id. at 175.
29. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, an executive order was struck down
by the Supreme Court because it had no basis of authority either in statute or in the
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in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that disclosure
regulations under Executive Order 11,246 did not have the force and
effect of law and thus did not alter the disclosures prohibited by the
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905.3" The Court noted, "[i]t has been
established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated,
substantive agency regulations have the 'force and effect of law."''3'
However, "in order for such regulations to have the 'force and effect
of law,' it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations
and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by
Congress."32 In Chrysler Corp., this alleged nexus was "so strained
that it would do violence to established principles of separation of
powers to denominate these particular regulations 'legislative' and
credit them with the 'binding effect of law'."33 Although this case did
not involve a direct challenge to an executive order,34 this logic
suggests that executive orders without any statutory basis will not
have the force and effect of law. As noted above, orders that do not
have the force and effect of law may not be challenged in federal
court because the federal courts only have jurisdiction over claims
arising under the laws of the United States.35
B. Allowance for a private right of action
Even if an executive order has the force and effect of law,
plaintiffs still need to demonstrate that a private right of action exists
to challenge the order.36 For example, in Independent Meat Packers
Ass'n v. Butz, the court heard an appeal from an order of the district
court enjoining implementation of United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) regulations.37 The district court had partially
Constitution. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ["the Steel Seizure Case"]. However, this decision has
been read by courts to hold that the Presidential orders will only have the force and effect
of law if there is a delegation from Congress because the Steel Seizure Case suggested that
there is no inherent authority for Presidential legislation in the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 966 (1976).
30. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
31. Id. at 295.
32. Id. at 304.
33. Id. at 307-08.
34. The case involved a challenge to regulations based upon an executive order.
35. See, e.g., Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1996) (superceded by statute
on other grounds as stated in Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1999)).
36. Liang, supra note 5, at 17-20. See also Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n, 526 F.2d at 236.
37. Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n, 526 F.2d at 231.
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based its decision on the fact that the regulations conflicted with
Executive Order 11,821.38 First, the appellate court determined that
the Executive Order did not have the force and effect of law because
the Order did not state a statutory basis for authority, and the
President merely intended the Order as a "managerial tool."39 The
court noted, "[e]ven if appellees [original plaintiffs] could show that
the Order has the force and effect of law, they would still have to
demonstrate that it was intended to create a private right of action."'
Because the Order did not expressly grant a right of action, the court
held that no private right of action existed. 1 If the existence of a
private right of action turns on whether the Order expressly grants a
right of action, this will make executive orders almost impossible to
challenge. Presidents are not likely to include provisions for private
rights of action to challenge their orders.
C. Exhausting Administrative Remedies
Even if an order has the "force and effect of law," potential
plaintiffs may have alternatives to federal court. If an executive order
provides for any type of remedy other than suit in federal court, a
court may require that potential plaintiffs exhaust these remedies
before filing suit.42 For example, in Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric
Co., a former lineman of Philadelphia Electric Company ["Electric
Company"] was injured in the course of work.43 The Electric
Company allowed him to change jobs for a short time, but then
required him to return to work as a lineman.' When the employee
refused, saying he was not physically able, the Electric Company fired
him.45 The former employee brought suit as a third party beneficiary
of contracts between the United States and the Electric Company
alleging violation of the nondiscrimination clause required by
executive order in government contracts.46 The court noted that there
38. See id. at 234.
39. Id. at 235-36.
40. Id. at 236.
41. Id.
42. Liang, supra note 5, at 10.
43. Farmer, 329 F.2d at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
Svrin2 20021 EXECUTIVE ORDERS
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was not a private right of action available.47 However, the holding,
affirming a motion to dismiss the complaint, was based on "the
doctrine of 'exhaustion of administrative remedies."'" Specifically,
the court concluded that the plaintiff should "be required to file a
complaint with an appropriate contracting agency or with the
President's Committee before being permitted to seek the aid of a
Federal district court.,
49
Once exhaustion through an executive agency is required, it
becomes unlikely that orders will be invalidated. The executive
branch is likely to rule in favor of maximum authority for the
executive agent, their employer. If a federal court accords deference
to that ruling, the plaintiff may not have the benefit of a non-biased
determining body. As a further obstacle to challenging executive
orders, Farmer itself suggests that the presence of alternative
remedies may be persuasive evidence that there is no allowance for a
private right of action."
D. Summary of Requirements for Executive Order Challenge
In conclusion, there are three main requirements for challenging
executive orders. First, the order must have the force and effect of
law in order for the federal court to have jurisdiction over the claim.
If the order has an express statutory basis, the order will have the
force and effect of law. If the order does not have an express
statutory basis, federal courts will determine whether there is any
implied Congressional authority. If there is not, the order will not
have the force and effect of law and thus will not be challengeable.
Second, there must be an allowance for a private right of action to
challenge the order. Federal courts may find that no private right of
action exists if the order does not expressly provide for such a right.
Finally, plaintiffs may need to exhaust administrative remedies.
Additionally, if the order provides for alternate remedies, the order
may be held not to allow for a private right of action in federal court.
47. Id. at 8-10. This may be partly due to the unusual nature of the case. See id. at 4
(noting this case appears to be the first time federal courts have addressed a case like this).
48. Id. at 10.
49. Farmer, 329 F.2d at 10. But see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 1201-
03 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding jurisdiction even though relevant executive orders provided an
alternative conflict resolution process).
50. Farmer, 329 F.2d at 8-10.
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E. Successful Challenges
Despite the inherent difficulties in challenging executive orders,
there have been some successful challenges. This next section looks
at four successful challenges to executive orders. These successful
challenges suggest at least four sets of circumstances under which
executive orders are limited. First, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer suggests that inherent Constitutional authority to issue
executive orders is limited. 1 Second, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Friedman suggests that executive authority based on a Congressional
grant is limited to the scope of that grant of authority. 2 Third,
Ozonoff v. Berzak indicates that executive orders cannot violate the
Constitution. 3 Finally, Chamber of Commerce v. Reich suggests that
executive orders are limited where the orders are pre-empted by
statute.4
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer - Order Based on Claimed
Inherent Authority
The only Supreme Court case regarding executive orders
involved President Truman's Executive Order 10,340."5 In late 1951,
steel companies and employees began arguing over terms and
conditions of employment. 6  After several federal attempts to
encourage settlement, the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O.,
gave notice for a strike on April 4, 1952."7 President Truman,
concerned about the national supply of steel for war materials, issued
Executive Order 10,340, which authorized the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills to ensure that
the mills continued to function. 8 The mill owners argued that this
51. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Liang, supra note
5, at 25.
52. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1981); Liang, supra
note 5, at 29-30.
53. Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1984); Liang, supra note 5, at 27-28.
54. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Liang, supra note
5, at 33. See also Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 395 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (concluding that enforcement of Executive Order 13202 should not have been
enjoined because it was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act).
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952) ("the Steel
Seizure Case").
56. Id. at 582.
57. Id. at 583.
58. Id. at 582-83.
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action was legislative and beyond Presidential authority.59 The Court
agreed with the mill owners and upheld the district court ruling,
striking down the Order.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, first established that
"[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."' Although
there was neither an express Constitutional nor a Congressional grant
of this authority, President Truman cited an implied grant of this
power pursuant to a combination of three Constitutional provisions:
(1) "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America;" '6 (2) the President "shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed; 6 2 and (3) the President's power as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.63 The Court dealt with
the Commander in Chief argument first. Without clearly stating a
test for the proper limit of Presidential power as Commander in
Chief, the Court said that this power would not support "tak[ing]
possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from
stopping production. ''64 The Court then rejected President Truman's
other arguments based on both the framework and language of the
Constitution. The Court concluded that the President's role as law
executor was contrary to the idea that the President could also be a
lawmaker.65 Justice Black wrote of the President, "[t]he Constitution
limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of
laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. ' 66 * The
Court noted that Article I expressly gave all lawmaking power to
Congress.67
It was clear from the Steel Seizure Case that there were limits on
executive order power where there was no statutory basis and the
Order went beyond the scope of the inherent powers of the President
under the Constitution.6' The Supreme Court did not state a clear
59. Id. at 582.
60. Id. at 585.
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c. 1.
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
64. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 587-88. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
68. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89.
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standard to determine whether an executive order was beyond the
scope of inherent powers. However, the Steel Seizure Case stands for
the proposition that executive order power may be limited when the
order is not based on statute and not supported by inherent
Presidential Constitutional authority.69
2. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Friedman - Order Beyond the Scope
of Granting Authority
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Friedman, insurance
companies challenged a determination by Weldon J. Rougeau, the
Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs,
that insurance companies were subcontractors within the meaning of
Executive Order No. 11,246.70 First, the court affirmed that the
insurance companies were subcontractors within the meaning of the
regulations." However, the court held that the "application of the
Executive Order to plaintiffs is not reasonably within the
contemplation of any statutory grant of authority."72  The court
concluded, "the question is 'whether or to what extent Congress did
grant.., such authority' to the executive branch of the
government."73  In analyzing the extent of authority granted by
Congress, the court assumed that the Order was based on the
Procurement Act. 4 However, the court found that the government
agents had "acted outside any grant of legislative authority when they
sought to impose the requirements of Executive Order 11,246 upon
plaintiffs. 75
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the court applied Chrysler
Corp.76 to find that even if statutory authority was assumed, the
Congressional grant of authority would need to "reasonably
contemplate" the regulations issued.7 Thus, after an executive order
is traced back to the basis of authority, the order (or regulations
based on that order) cannot exceed the scope of that grant of
69. See id.
70. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 165.
71. Id. at 166-67.
72. Id. at 168.
73. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 665 (1976)).
74. Id. at 170.
75. Id. at 172.
76. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
77. Friedman, 639 F.2d at 169.
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authority.
3. Ozonoff v. Berzak - Order that Violates the Constitution
In Ozonoff v. Berzak, the plaintiff challenged Executive Order
No. 10,422, which required citizens to pass a loyalty check before they
entered employment for an international organization."8 The court
found the Order unconstitutionally broad under the First
Amendment, or at least unlawful as applied to a World Health
Organization (WHO) applicant.79
Ozonoff made it clear that the First Amendment could limit
broad executive action. Since an executive order must have the force
and effect of law to be challengeable, it is not surprising that these
"laws" are limited by the Constitution. Thus, although Ozonoff only
dealt with the First Amendment, it is clear that executive order power
is limited by the Constitution.
4. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich - Order Based on Statute That
Violates Another Statute
In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia struck down President Clinton's Executive
Order No. 12,964 because the Order was pre-empted by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). ° Clinton's Executive Order declared
that "contracting agencies shall not contract with employers that
permanently replace lawfully striking employees. ' '8' The Secretary of
Labor, Reich, issued regulations that implemented the Order.' The
Chamber of Commerce and other concerned entities sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the
regulations. 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the Order did not comply
with the Procurement Act on which it was based and that it violated
an employer's statutory right under the NLRA. '
First, the court noted that it could review the legality of the
President's action through a suit seeking to enjoin a President's agent
78. Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 225-26.
79. Id. at 230-34.
80. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1324, 1339.
81. Id. at 1324 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995)).
82. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1324.
83. Id. at 1325.
84. Id.
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from enforcing the action." Next, the court found that the plaintiffs
had a cause of action and that sovereign immunity was waived under
the Administrative Procurement Act, 6 even though the plaintiffs did
not explicitly bring suit under the APA.' The court concluded that
the Executive Order conflicted with and was preempted by the
NLRA.88
Chamber of Commerce suggests that executive order authority
may not be exercised in cases where the order is based on a statute
and is preempted by another statute. However, the holding may be
limited to orders that conflict with the NLRA because the court
engaged in a discussion of federal pre-emption under the NLRA" If
the holding is not construed narrowly to apply only to cases of conflict
with the NLRA, then the case suggests, at least, that it must be clear
that the contrary statute pre-empts the executive order before the
order will be invalidated.
5. Conclusion
Case law suggests that executive orders may be successfully
challenged if they are beyond the scope of Constitutional and
Congressional grants of authority. Orders may also be successfully
challenged if they violate the Constitution or are preempted by
statute. Even if there are grounds to challenge an executive order,
the prerequisites discussed earlier will still need to be met.
II. Clinton's Executive Example
In order to understand fully the difficulty in challenging
executive orders, this Note will next consider an executive order from
President Clinton using the framework for challenging executive
orders discussed in Part I. This Note will first consider the text and
effect of the executive order, Executive Order No. 13,083,' to provide
an example of why one might want to challenge an executive order.
Next, this Note will demonstrate the difficulties in challenging the
Order based upon the criteria established in Part I.
On May 14, 1998, President Clinton issued Executive Order
85. Id. at 1328.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
87. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1328-30.
88. Id. at 1338-39.
89. Id. at 1333-39.
90. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (May 14, 1998).
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13,083 setting out "federalism" guidelines, which federal agencies
were to consider before drafting regulations.9' The goal of this Order
sounds harmless enough until one examines the language of the
Order itself. The Order noted that it is important for agencies "to
recognize the distinction between matters of national or multi-state
scope (which may justify Federal action) and matters that are merely
common to the States."' Then the Order listed some matters which
would require federal action including, but not limited to: "[w]hen
there is a need for uniform national standards," "[w]hen
decentralization increases the costs of government thus imposing
additional burdens on the taxpayer," and "[w]hen States would be
reluctant to impose necessary regulations because of fears that
regulated business activity will relocate to other States." 93
This language represented a broad expansion of federal
oversight. For example, the language "need for uniform national
standards" is not further defined." Uniform national standards in the
area of criminal law would certainly facilitate crime prevention by
providing citizens with notice of which activities are prohibited and
aiding in the prosecution of cross-jurisdictional crimes. However,
except for federal crimes, criminal law is an area that is generally left
up to state control. Similarly, the language "[w]hen States would be
reluctant to impose necessary regulations because of fears that
regulated business activity will relocate to other States" is not further
defined.95 Since any business regulation might make businesses move
to another state, this concern is potentially involved in every state
regulation decision. However, regulations of businesses that do not
fall under Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce
are left to state discretion by the Constitution.' This Executive Order
could provide a basis for federal intrusion into traditional state
arenas, contrary to legislative decisions and the Constitution.
Even if this Order is not an unconstitutional extension of federal
power,9' the Order reflects a policy decision that will influence
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
97. The order does note that "[t]here should be strict adherence to constitutional
principles." Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (May 14, 1998).
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regulations. Those regulations could adversely affect state and local
autonomy. This policy decision might be best as a product of the
debate and compromise that occurs in Congress.
Assuming that one wanted to challenge Executive Order 13,083,
the pertinent question for this Note is not why one would want to
challenge the Order, but whether one could challenge the Order.
First, as discussed above, for jurisdictional reasons, this Order would
need to have the force and effect of law.98 However, this Order does
not cite a specific statutory or Constitutional basis for the Order."
The Order states that it is issued "[b]y the authority vested in me
[Clinton] as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America.""4 Since no specific statutory authority is cited, a
federal court might apply a Chrysler Corp."' type of analysis and find
that the Order did not have the force and effect of law. If the Order
does not have the force and effect of law, it could not be challenged at
all."4  It is also possible that a court might find an implied
Congressional grant of authority for the Order. If the federal court
found an implied grant of authority, it is possible that the court would
find that the Order was within that grant of authority and thus valid.1"3
Assuming a federal court found an implied statutory basis for the
Order, a potential plaintiff would next need to prove that there was a
private right of action available.
The plain text of the Order makes it clear that there is no private
right of action created:
This order is intended only to improve the internal
management of the executive branch and is not intended to,
and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the
United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.' °4
Since there is no private right of action created by this Order, an
individual may not be able to challenge the Order in federal court."
98. See supra Part IA.
99. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (1998).
100. Id.
101. See supra note 31-36 and accompanying text.
102. See supra Part IA.
103. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied sub nom. Contractors Ass'n v. Hodgson, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
104. Exec. Order No. 13,083,63 Fed. Reg. at 27,653 (May 14, 1998).
105. See supra Part lB.
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Additionally, as noted above, the fact that no private right of action
exists may be evidence that the Order does not have the force and
effect of law. Under this analysis, even if a court were to follow the
Steel Seizure Case and find that there was no Constitutional authority
to issue the Order so that it should be invalid, potential plaintiffs
could not bring the claim without a private right of action."°
Potential plaintiffs may also have difficulty challenging this
Order under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine."7 The Order
requires agencies to review the waiver process. 'O It further notes that
agencies "shall, to the extent practicable and permitted by law,
consider any application by a State or local government for a waiver
of statutory or regulatory requirements . . . ."" This section of the
Order suggests that there is a waiver process by which state and local
governments could apply to waive any regulation issued under the
Order. Thus, it is likely that a federal court would require a state or
local government plaintiff to apply for a waiver and be denied before
challenging the Order or its application in federal court.
In conclusion, under current laws, Executive Order No. 13,083
would be almost impossible to challenge. First, it is unlikely that a
federal court would find that the Order has the force and effect of law
so federal courts would not have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge.
Second, even if the Order had the force and effect of law, it expressly
disallows a private right of action. Finally, even if a private right of
action existed under another legislative or Constitutional provision, a
federal court would likely require, at minimum, that state and local
government officials exhaust the remedies provided in the statute.
Interestingly, this particular order was overruled in another way;
there was such a public outcry over this action, " ' that President
Clinton suspended the Order three months later."'
106. See supra note 36-41 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part IC.
108. The waiver process is described below.
109. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,653 (1998).
110. John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part Two), 31
UWLA L. REV. 123, 129 (2000) (quoting Catharine Edwards, Executive Orders-
Emergency Rule, Abuse of Power?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS MAGAZINE (Aug. 23,1999), at
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=210404).
111. See Executive Order 13095,63 Fed. Reg. 42,565 (1998).
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EXECUTIVE ORDERS
I. Separation of Powers Restoration Act
On March 6, 2001, Representative Ronald Paul introduced the
Separation of Powers Restoration Act [the "Act"] to Congress."2 The
Act was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, where it
currently waits for approval."3 The goal of the act is "[t]o restore the
separation of powers between the Congress and the President.
114
This section will analyze the Act and discuss how it would facilitate
challenges to executive orders."5 First, this section will address the
coverage of the Act. Then, this section will examine the Act's
requirement of a Statement of Authority, the Act's limit on the effect
of executive orders, and the Act's standing provisions.
A. Coverage of the Act
The Act sets limits on and requirements for "Presidential
order[s].. '..6  The Act defines a "Presidential order" as "(1) any
Executive order, Presidential proclamation, or Presidential directive;
and (2) any other Presidential or Executive action by whatever name
described purporting to have normative effect outside the executive
branch which is issued under the authority of the President or any
other officer or employee of the executive branch.""' According to
the plain language, this definition includes both executive orders and
regulations issued by other officials of the executive branch.
The broad definition, standing alone, is not a change from the
common law. Many challenges to executive orders actually involve
challenges to regulations issued pursuant to those orders."' In these
cases, federal courts have treated the regulations as derivative of the
executive order which directed their issuance."9 "Regulations which
are promulgated pursuant to the [Executive] Order likewise have the
force and effect of law, provided that they are not inconsistent with
112. See H.R. 864,107th Cong. (2001).
113. See id. (Bill Tracking Report available on LEXIS (2001)).
114. Id.
115. This Note will only deal with Sections 3, 4, 5 & 7 of the Act. Section 1 contains
the title of the Act. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001). Section 2 recites the Congressional
findings on which the Act is based. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001). Section 6 relates to
National Emergency Power. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 6 (2001).
116. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 7 (2001).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Chamber of Commerce v.
Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
119. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 304; Reich, 74 F.3d at 1324, 1339.
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the [Executive] Order or otherwise plainly unreasonable. 1 20 Thus, in
practice, the broad scope of the Act's definition of "Presidential
order" would not change the common law analysis of challenges to
regulatory action pursuant to executive orders.
B. "Statement of Authority"
The Act requires a "statement of authority" for any "Presidential
order."'' 2' This Section of the Act requires that the President "provide
for each Presidential order a statement of the specific statutory or
Constitutional provision which in fact grants the President the
authority claimed for such action. ' ,12' The Act declares invalid any
Presidential order which does not include the statement of authority
if the basis of authority is Congressional enactment. 3
Although this provision seems to limit executive order authority,
there is unlikely to be any practical effect. Most executive orders
already cite either a statutory or Constitutional basis. If this Act were
passed, Presidents would be even more likely to cite some basis for
their action. Even if an order did not include the statement of
authority, it would still be valid under the Act if it were based on
Constitutional authority because the invalidity provision only applies
to executive orders issued pursuant to Congressional mandate. Thus,
as a practical matter, this section of the Act only facilitates challenges
to executive orders by ensuring that federal courts will not need to
search for the basis of authority for the executive order.
C. Limiting the Effect of Presidential Orders
The Act would also limit the effect of Presidential orders.
2 4
Section 3 of the Act begins with a broad limit on Presidential orders
declaring, "[a] Presidential order neither constitutes nor has the force
of law and is limited in its application and effect to the executive
branch.,121 Standing alone, this clause would end challenges to
executive orders. If executive orders lack the force and effect of law,
120. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364, 368 (D.D.C. 1979) (upholding an
executive order regarding discovery procedures and the regulations implementing those
procedures pursuant to executive order).
121. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 4 (2001).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
125. Id. at § 3(a).
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then the orders are not laws of the United States and federal courts
would not have jurisdiction over suits based on the orders.16
However, the Act limits this broad statement with exceptions.
Thus, the provision of the Act declaring that executive orders do not
have the force of law does not apply to: reprieves or pardons (except
in cases of impeachment), orders to military personnel related to
actions as Commander in Chief, or orders pursuant to Congressional
enactment that meet further criteria. 28 To meet the Congressional
enactment exception, the order must cite the specific Congressional
enactment, be pursuant to that enactment, be within the limits of the
plain language of that enactment, and not be pursuant to treaty or
bilateral or multilateral agreement which delegates power to a foreign
entity not authorized under the Constitution or violates the Ninth or
Tenth Amendments to the Constitution.
129
For Presidential orders relying on statutory authority, this
section would not change the common law. Due to the statement of
authority section of the Act, the President will already need to state
the basis for his action, so citing the Congressional enactment is at
most a procedural change.' 0 In addition, lower courts have already
required that Presidential action based on statute be within the limits
of the authority granted by the statute.'31 Thus, this section of the Act
does not limit challenges to executive orders based on statutory
authority.
However, if the Act is interpreted based on the plain language,
the Act limits challenges to executive orders not based on statutory
authority. As discussed above,32 there are executive orders based on
implied Congressional authority and orders based on inherent
Constitutional authority. Under section 3 of the Act, such orders no
longer have the force and effect of law and are limited in scope to the
executive branch. This means that citizens, entities, and governments
harmed by regulations promulgated under orders pursuant to implied
Congressional authority or inherent Constitutional authority could
not challenge the underlying executive order in federal court. For
126. See supra Part IA.
127. HR. 864, 107th Cong. § 3(b) (2001).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 172 (4th Cir. 1981).
132. See supra Part I.
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example, in the Steel Seizure Case, the plaintiffs would have had no
standing to sue because the order was based on inherent
Constitutional authority,'33 and under this Act, that order would not
have the force and effect of law. Thus, although this section of the
Act does not change the common law with respect to orders based on
statutory authority, the Act might make it impossible to challenge an
executive order based on implied Congressional authority or
Constitutional authority.
D. Standing for Challenging Executive Orders
The Act grants standing to several individuals and entities to
challenge executive orders.' First, the Act declares that the standing
granted is limited to challenges of "the validity of any Presidential
order which exceeds the power granted to the President by the
relevant authorizing statute or the Constitution."'35 The Act grants
standing to bring these challenges against executive orders to:
(1) Congress and its members if the order infringes on Congressional
power, exceeds power granted by Congressional enactment or does
not include a statement of authority when the authority is statutory;
(2) to state and local governments officials if the order infringes on
state or local power granted under Congressional enactment or
treaty; and (3) to persons "aggrieved in a liberty or property interest
adversely affected directly by the challenged order."'36 This section of
the Act facilitates challenging executive orders. With this language,
Congress eliminated the need to prove a private right of action and
possibly the need to prove that the order has the force and effect of
law.
137
There is no need to prove a private right of action because the
Act declares that "[t]he following persons may bring an action in an
appropriate United States court.', 38  This language establishes a
private right of action for Congress and its members when the order is
based on statutory authority or interferes with Congressional
authority.9 Under the Act, Congress could challenge an order based
133. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
134. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See discussion infra.
138. Id.
139. Id. at § 5(1). This language may be a reaction to Raines v. Byrd where the
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either on statute (expressly or impliedly) or inherent Constitutional
authority provided that the order adversely affected Congressional
authority. Arguably, it would only be advantageous for a member of
Congress to attack an order if it adversely affected Congressional
power; so, the Act effectively confers a private right of action on
members of Congress for any needed circumstance.
The Act also establishes a private right of action for state and
local government officials when the order violates rights based on
Congressional enactments or treaties.' Unlike the Congressional
right of action, there may be circumstances that are not covered by
this language. For example, if state or local government officials
wanted to challenge an executive order that infringed on state power
as granted by the Constitution, the language would not provide that
right of action. Nevertheless, this language is still sufficiently broad
to make some challenges brought by state and local government
officials easier to support.
Finally, the language establishes a private right of action for any
person whose liberty or property interest is directly and adversely
affected by the order.'' This language is sufficiently broad to cover
both executive orders based on statutory authority and orders based
on Constitutional authority. Since only directly injured persons
would be able to bring an action in federal court under standing
requirements, this language effectively applies to all challenges of
executive orders by individuals. Thus, by conferring a private right of
action in many cases in which executive orders would be challenged,
the Act facilitates challenges to executive orders.
It is possible that the standing provisions of the Act would also
eliminate the need for federal courts to determine if the regulation
has the force and effect of law.' 2 The requirement that an executive
order have the "force and effect of law" is related to federal court
jurisdiction.' 3 By providing that "[t]he following persons may bring
an action in an appropriate United States court to challenge the
validity of any Presidential order,"'" Congress may specifically be
Supreme Court held that members of Congress did not have standing to challenge
Presidential vetoes based on the Line Item Veto Act. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830
(1997).
140. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 5(2) (2001).
141. Id. at § 5(3).
142. See id. at § 5.
143. See supra Part IA.
144. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001).
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extending federal court jurisdiction to these cases. If Congress is
automatically giving federal courts jurisdiction over actions
challenging Presidential orders, then the section which limits the
effect of Presidential orders"5 would have no effect on the ability to
bring challenges to executive orders. This interpretation would allow
challenges to any Presidential order, provided the individual met the
requirements of the Act itself.' However, it is not clear what the
language "appropriate United States court" means.'47 It is possible
that this language merely means choosing the "appropriate" court
based upon geographic and other personal jurisdictional criteria.
However, it is also possible that, in the context of the Act as a whole,
including the language limiting the effect of Presidential orders, the
language "appropriate" still requires an evaluation of the
jurisdictional requirement of whether a federal question exists.
Under this interpretation, it is possible that no "appropriate" court
would exist for challenges where the order does not have the force
and effect of law. The impact of this section of the Act with respect
to determinations of whether the order has the force and effect of law
is uncertain.
E. Facilitating Challenges Under the Separation of Powers Act
The Act facilitates challenges to executive orders in several ways.
First, the Act requires a statement of the basis of authority for any
executive order.' This requirement will likely encourage Presidents
to include the basis for their executive order, which will allow courts
to determine clearly the basis of authority. Second, the Act
eliminates the need to prove a private right of action provided a
plaintiff meets certain criteria.' 9 Finally, the Act may confer
jurisdiction on federal courts over all executive orders, which would
eliminate the need to determine if the order has the "force and effect
of law."'5°
IV. Conclusion
The separation of powers among the legislative, jbdicial, and
145. See supra Part IIIC.
146. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
147. H.R. 864,107th Cong. § 5 (2001).
148. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 4 (2001).
149. H.R. 864, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001).
150. Id.
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executive branches is a founding principle of the American system.
Executive orders which are legislative in nature can upset the balance
of the separation of powers by concentrating legislative power in the
executive branch. Executive orders are protected from judicial
review by common law requirements for challenging an executive
order. To challenge an executive order in federal court, potential
plaintiffs must prove that the order has the force and effect of law and
that there is a private right of action. Even if plaintiffs prove both of
those requirements, potential plaintiffs may need to exhaust
administrative remedies and the existence of alternative remedies
may be proof that no federal judicial remedy exists. This Note has
demonstrated the difficulty in challenging an executive order by
applying the current challenge requirements to an executive order
from President Clinton.
Analysis of successful challenges to executive orders suggests
four areas in which federal courts will overturn orders. First, federal
courts may overturn executive orders based solely on inherent
Constitutional authority. Second, federal courts may overturn
executive orders based on Congressional grant of authority if the
order exceeds the scope of that grant of authority. Third, federal
courts may overturn executive orders that violate the Constitution.
Finally, federal courts may overturn executive orders, which are pre-
empted by other statues.
The Separation of Powers Restoration Act would make
executive orders easier to challenge in federal courts. The Act
requires a statement of authority, eliminates the need to prove a
private right of action, and may eliminate the need to prove that the
challenged order has the force and effect of law. Because this Act
facilitates challenges to executive orders, it will help protect the
separation of powers by allowing Presidential legislative actions to be
challenged in federal court, just as other legislative actions may be
challenged. The Act will assist Congress, the judiciary, and the public
in ensuring that the President is not legislating without supervision
and will help protect our country from "the very definition of
tyranny..''..
151. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888).
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